The case (HR-2023-2068-A) concerns an employee who alternated fixed available periods and periods off work according to his working time arrangement.

After having been granted a reduction in his normal working hours, he claimed for a reduction, accordingly, to its available time pursuant to the CBA.

In the CBA, the available period is when the employee can be called to work at any time.

The question is whether the employee’s available time is to be regarded as “working hours.”

The Supreme Court first noted that the employee during standby time, until called upon, was in no way subject to the employer's directives.

In this respect, the Court referred to the concept of working time contained in the European directive - transposed into national law - and to the case law of the EU Court of Justice, stating that, to be considered as actual working time, the employee must be placed in a situation where he or she is legally obliged to obey the instructions of his or her employer and perform an activity for the latter.

Since the employer during the available time does not affect, neither objectively nor significantly, the employee's ability to freely manage his free time and pursue his interests, the Supreme Court concluded that the employee's available time did not meet the conditions for working time under Section 2(1) of the Working Time Directive and, therefore, not under Section 10-1 of the WEA.

Consequently, the Supreme Court confirmed the Court of Appeal's decision, stating that the right to reduced working hours did not give the right to a corresponding reduction in the available time.